Japan and the USSR - history in documents. Signing of the neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan Signing of the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression pact

Denunciation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Treaty of 1941

The Neutrality Pact of 1941 between the USSR and Japan is often called the Non-Aggression Pact, thus trying to put it on par with the Molotov-Ribbetrop Pact of August 23, 1939, but this is a mistake.

This document is called the Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941. Its main part was the second article, which read: “In the event that one of the Contracting Parties becomes the object of hostilities on the part of one or more third powers, the other Contracting Party will remain neutral during the continuation of the entire conflict.” But the war in the Asia-Pacific theater of operations does not fit this formulation, since Japan was not an object, but a subject of action, the first to attack the United States on December 7, 1941, attacking the Pearl Harbor naval base. On December 8, the Japanese blocked the British in Hong Kong and attacked Thailand, Malaya, which belonged to England, and the Philippines (a US colony).

The treaty was valid for 5 years and ended in April 1946; the USSR and Japan could cancel it by notifying the other country 6 months in advance. On April 5, 1945, Moscow sent a note to Tokyo announcing the denunciation of the pact.

The USSR argued its position:

Referring to Japan's violation of the spirit and partly the letter of the neutrality treaty (Japan helped Germany, with whom the USSR was at war);

To change in international circumstances (Japan was at war with the USA and England, which became allies of Moscow);

He pointed to cases of detention and sinking of Soviet civilian ships by the Japanese Navy and Air Force, and incidents on the border. For example: in December 1941, Japanese planes attacked and sank the Maykop tanker.

Thus, we can conclude that talk about Moscow’s “treachery” has no basis. The treaty was officially terminated, the USSR had complete “free hands”.

The myth of the “saving” Siberian divisions

Quite often you can find discussions on the topic of the Siberian divisions that saved Moscow, finally stopping the German “blitzkrieg” and launching a counter-offensive near Moscow.

In reality, units from the Far East and Siberia did not play a decisive role during the Battle of Moscow. In 1941, 16 divisions were transferred from East to West, in 1942 - 5 divisions. Almost 300 divisions fought as part of the Red Army, that is, it is not entirely correct to talk about the decisive contribution of the Siberian divisions in the Moscow counter-offensive. The High Command Headquarters had other fairly large reserves, and even without the transfer of divisions from the Far East, the offensive would have taken place. The defeat of the Wehrmacht was natural - the German units were exhausted and lost their offensive potential in the fierce battles that took place before the arrival of the “Siberian” divisions.

The USSR could not transfer more divisions from the East, Japan attacked the USA and Great Britain on December 7-8, and the counter-offensive near Moscow began on December 5.

In addition, the USSR indirectly helped the United States and its allies on the Asia-Pacific front - Japan kept a large army and part of its navy on the border with the Union.

On the reasons for the USSR's entry into the war against Japan

Request from the allies of the USSR in the war against the Third Reich. At the Tehran Conference of 1943, Roosevelt asked the USSR to act against Japan. Stalin gave his consent. In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, the USSR confirmed its commitment to enter the war with Japan no later than 3 months after the victory over the Reich. The leaders of the USA and Great Britain understood that it was impossible to defeat Japan in a short time without the help of the USSR; they would have to land large forces on the mainland for the final victory, killing a large number of people and wasting enormous resources. Therefore, the question of the USSR entering the war against Japan was very important for them.

Moscow wanted to return those lost in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. territories - the Kuril ridge and South Sakhalin. They are of strategic importance for Russia, allowing navigation bypassing the First Kuril Strait, turning the Sea of ​​Okhotsk into Soviet territorial waters, thereby ensuring the security of coastal ports.

On the elimination by Soviet troops of the threat of a Japanese “asymmetric response” in response to American atomic strikes

Tokyo was ready to “response” to nuclear attacks on its cities. “Detachment 731,” under the leadership of General Shiro Ishii, created quite significant reserves of biological weapons, including ready-made “ammunition,” the use of which could lead to large casualties among enemy troops and among civilians. The detachment was stationed in Chinese territory captured by the Japanese in the area of ​​the village of Pingfang, Binjiang province, twenty kilometers south of Harbin. Japanese military doctors created an entire plant for the production of plague, glanders, anthrax, leprosy, and syphilis viruses. Up to 500-600 kg of bacterial mass of anthrax, up to 300 kg of plague, 800-900 kg of typhoid fever, dysentery, and up to 1000 kg of cholera were produced per month.

Special ceramic bombs were created that could be used to deliver not only bacteria, but also infected ticks, fleas, etc. to enemy territory. In 1940, biological attacks were carried out against Chinese troops, and biological sabotage was carried out against the USSR.

After the end of World War II, the commander of the Kwantung Army, General Yamada Otozo, admitted that “bacteriological weapons would have been used against the United States, England and other states if the Soviet Union had not acted against Japan. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan and the rapid advance of the Red Army deep into Manchuria deprived us of the opportunity to use bacteriological weapons against the USSR and other countries.”

Having received a nuclear strike, the Japanese military command began to prepare for a retaliatory strike; it was ready to use biological weapons on its territory during an American landing. Only an unexpected blow by Soviet troops and their rapid approach to the town of Pingfang forced the destruction of most of the laboratories and documentation, and a significant part of the employees to commit suicide.

Tokyo even had the opportunity to use biological weapons on US territory, delivering them using I-400 series submarines. An outbreak of an epidemic in densely populated areas of the West Coast of the United States would be a very unpleasant event for them.

The black myth about the “atrocities of the red soldiers” in Korea

Some Western historians (for example, Michael Brin) have created a myth about the violence that Soviet soldiers allegedly committed in Korea.

There are several features of this myth:

- several cases of antisocial behavior of Soviet soldiers are transferred by Western researchers to the entire army;

- for some reason, “atrocities” were not remembered during the Cold War between the USSR and the West, although such propaganda material was in great demand at that time;

Western researchers forget that in any army in the world, as in any society, there is always a percentage of people prone to antisocial behavior and looting. Although in the Red Army, through the efforts of political officers (commissars), special officers who monitored the moral character of the Red Army soldiers, this percentage was lower than in the armies of other countries.

In August 1945, General I.M. Chistyakov, commander of the 25th Army of the 1st Far Eastern Front, was given a directive from the Central Committee, which contained instructions not to interfere with the creation of democratic organizations on the liberated Korean lands, to explain to the civilian population the goals of the Red Army, and to the Red Army soldiers to behave correct, do not offend the religious feelings of the local population.

The “atrocities” of Soviet troops in the liberated territories are also refuted by archival data. There are almost no cases of looters, their percentage is even lower than in the territory of occupied Germany. Apparently, it was due to the fact that the Red Army soldiers did not see the Koreans or residents of Northern China as enemies, but saw the population being liberated from Japanese oppression.

Let's summarize

1. The defeat of the Japanese army in Northern China and Korea undermined the ability of the Japanese Empire to conduct further military operations.

2. The entry of the USSR into the war saved the United States and its allies from being exposed (possibly even on US territory) to biological weapons, which would have led to large losses among the Allied troops and among the civilian population, including the Japanese.

3. Without the USSR entering the war with the Empire of Japan, World War II would have lasted until 1946-1947.

4. The USSR's entry into the war with Japan did not go beyond the framework of accepted international law, and the behavior of the Red Army soldiers in the occupied territory did not go beyond the scope of military law.

5. Soviet military authorities took all measures to reduce the possibility of conflict situations with the local population to a minimum.

On March 24, in a conversation with Molotov, the Japanese minister said that he was going to Berlin and Rome to establish personal contacts with the leaders of the Axis powers in connection with the conclusion of the tripartite pact, since the exchange of views on this issue was carried out only by telegraph. However, this does not exclude the fact that he, as the closest assistant in the past to Count S. Goto, the initiator of restoring relations with the USSR in 1925, strives to develop good relations with Moscow.

During his meeting with Stalin, Matsuoka confirmed his intention to improve relations with Moscow. To this Stalin replied: “Whatever the ideology in Japan or even in the USSR, this cannot prevent the practical rapprochement of the two states if there is a desire on both sides... As for the Anglo-Saxons, the Russians have never been their friends and now, perhaps, they don’t really want to be friends with them.” In conclusion, he supported the Axis states' desire to control the capitalists.

The Japanese minister recalled that in 1932 he supported Moscow's initiative to conclude a non-aggression pact. And although the Japanese government did not respond to this proposal at that time, he continued his individual work in favor of concluding such a pact. After his appointment in 1940 as head of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, he began to see the implementation of this idea as an urgent need, in addition to resolving issues such as the conclusion of a trade agreement and the signing of a new fisheries convention, negotiations on which were progressing quite successfully.

Touching upon the issue of Japanese oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin, Matsuoka recalled that they were provided in 1925 (until 1995) as compensation for damage caused to Japan in connection with the incident in Nikolaev during the Civil War, where Many Japanese were killed.

In response to Molotov’s proposal to liquidate concessions, the Japanese minister raised the question of the sale of Northern Sakhalin, citing the fact that the Japanese came to this island back in the 16th century, and the Russians “took” it from Japan relatively recently, at the beginning of the Meiji period (1875). G.). At the same time, Matsuoka spoke in favor of speeding up the resolution of the issue of the border between the USSR and Manchukuo.

He further emphasized that Japan, having concluded an alliance with Germany, does not intend to quarrel with the USSR and will strive to ensure that the same relations are maintained between the Soviet Union and Germany. However, if the USSR cooperates with the USA against Japan as against a common enemy, then the latter will be forced, having attacked the USSR, to deal with its opponents separately.

In response, Molotov said that since 1932, when Japan rejected the Soviet proposal for a non-aggression pact, the situation in the world has changed significantly - now the USSR has such a treaty with Germany, and Japan has an alliance pact with the latter. The USSR's pact with Germany turned out to be possible because, according to Molotov, she correctly understood the interests of the Soviet Union, which in turn realized the interests of Germany.

Making it clear that it was advisable for Japan and the USSR to use this example, Molotov said: “As for the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Japan, the Soviet side also takes this issue seriously, based on the principles from which it proceeded when concluding agreement with Germany."

This circumstance, from our point of view, is of fundamental importance for assessing different interpretations of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, which will be discussed below.

Referring to the issue of recognition by the Soviet Union of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty between Russia and Japan in 1925, Molotov said: “What was established in the relationship between our countries after the defeat of Russia in 1905 cannot be left unchanged. It is clear that the USSR is looking at the Portsmouth Treaty the treaty with approximately the same feeling as in Germany they feel about the Treaty of Versailles. So the Portsmouth Treaty is a bad basis for developing and improving relations. Moreover, Japan violated this treaty in relation to Manchuria.”

The Soviet leader also regarded the reminder of the Nikolaev events as inappropriate, citing the fact that they occurred at the last stage of the Japanese intervention in the Amur region and Primorye, during a period of very bad relations between the two countries.

On the issue of the interests of the USSR and Japan in the area of ​​Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, Molotov said that “he views the proposal to sell Northern Sakhalin as a joke.” “No one here would understand the sale of Northern Sakhalin now, since they remember that only as a result of defeat in 1905, Russia was forced to give up the southern half of Sakhalin,” Molotov continued. “It would be more understandable to our public opinion if, as a correction to the Portsmouth Treaty concluded after the defeat, the question of purchasing the southern part of Sakhalin was raised, and the issue of price could be resolved by agreement. Now it would be more correct to raise the question of purchasing from Japan not only the southern part of Sakhalin, but also some group of the Northern Kuril Islands(emphasis added - K.Ch.)».

Thus, it is obvious that the growing threat from Germany forced the USSR to talk no longer about the gratuitous return of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, but only about the purchase of part of these territories.

Molotov expressed the hope that the Japanese government, seeking to conclude a non-aggression pact based on mutual interests, as Germany did in 1939, would favorably approach the issue of the USSR purchasing the Northern Kuril Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin.

Regarding relations with the United States, Molotov assured that the Soviet government “has no intention of concluding an agreement to attack Japan.”

At the end of the conversation, the head of the Soviet government proposed limiting ourselves to concluding a Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact so that “issues requiring lengthy discussion would not need to be touched upon.” At the same time, Molotov added that “during his meetings in Berlin with Hitler and Ribbentrop, and in particular in the last conversation with Ribbentrop, he was quite specifically told that on the issue of concessions in Northern Sakhalin, Japan would meet the Soviet side halfway” on the recommendation of his main ally in the tripartite pact.

On March 26, Matsuoka arrived in Berlin and the next day began negotiations with Ribbentrop and Hitler.

Without disclosing how to implement Plan Barbarossa - a plan for war against the USSR, Ribbentrop expressed interest in ensuring that Japan, as an ally of Germany, did not interfere in this possible war (in accordance with Article 5 of the Tripartite Pact), since Germany expected to independently decide the fate of all territories The USSR after its lightning defeat without the participation of Japan. At the same time, the latter was supposed to provide assistance to Germany by striking Singapore, the main British military base in the Far East.

But the Japanese minister, limiting himself to a personal promise, made it clear that he did not intend to remain a statistic in the event of the division of the territory of the USSR after its defeat. Matsuoka did not hide his intention to conclude a neutrality pact with the USSR, which would serve as a guarantee of the security of Japan's rear during its expansion to the South, directed against the interests of England and especially the United States in the area.

From this point of view, the opinion of the former head of the information department of the Japanese War Ministry, Lieutenant General H. Hata, who, while in Soviet captivity, noted in his testimony: “As for the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, this step was aimed at strengthening the Japanese position towards the United States."

In a conversation with Ribbentrop on March 29, Matsuoka expressed his intention to once again invite the USSR to join the tripartite pact. Ribbentrop replied that “at present, due to the change in the situation, the question of this is no longer on the table,” and advised Matsuoka, during conversations with Soviet leaders in Moscow, not to touch upon or even enter into discussions with them on any issues related to this pact .

There is an opinion that, in accordance with the instructions of his government, which allowed the conclusion of a neutrality pact instead of a non-aggression pact with the USSR, Matsuoka negotiated its signing while in Moscow on March 24, passing through on the way to Germany and on the way back, starting on April 7. In fact, this point of view is not confirmed by the record of these negotiations set out above, from which it follows that only the Soviet side raised the issue.

Nevertheless, Matsuoka, with his broad powers, was determined to conclude a non-aggression or neutrality pact, contrary to Ribbentrop's warning, in order to maintain a free hand with regard to both Berlin and Moscow. This is supported by the following telegram from the German Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in Tokyo dated July 5, 1941:

“Concerning the question of Japan’s relations with Soviet Russia, I would like, for the purpose of your personal orientation, to correctly highlight the message about our conversation with him on the topic of a Japanese-Russian non-aggression or neutrality treaty.

According to your telegram No. 685 dated May 6, 1941, Matsuoka told you then that after his departure from Berlin he did not count on the possibility of concluding a Japanese-Russian neutrality pact. He expressed the same thing in a conversation with me, and only thought to take advantage of the opportunity if the Russians expressed readiness for this. With the message Matsuoka made to you then, apparently, he wanted to say that after the Berlin negotiations I should have taken into account the possibility of concluding a pact. Matsuoka made the same statement to Count Schulenburg in Moscow after an agreement had already been reached regarding the conclusion of the pact and just before its formal signing. At the same time, Mr. Matsuoka presented the conversation with me as if he had told me that he would not be able to avoid discussing in Moscow the long-pending issue of a Japanese-Soviet neutrality or non-aggression pact, that he, of course, was against any haste, but that he would have to something to do if the Russians meet Japanese desires halfway. I seemed to agree with his thought.

What Matsuoka stated to you, as well as to Count Schulenburg, does not correspond to reality. The subject of a Japanese-Soviet non-aggression and neutrality pact was raised in a conversation between Matsuoka and myself on March 26, 1941, and, according to a note made by Ambassador Schmidt immediately after our conversation, the subject developed in this manner.

In connection with the remark about the conclusion of the long-discussed Russian-Japanese trade agreement, Matsuoka directly asked me whether he should stop in Moscow on his way back to discuss a non-aggression or neutrality pact with the Russians. At the same time, he emphasized that the Japanese people would not allow Russia to directly join the Three-Power Pact, which would cause a general cry of indignation throughout Japan. I answered Matsuoka that there was nothing to think about accepting Russia as a member of the pact, and advised him, if possible, not to raise in Moscow the question of concluding the aforementioned non-aggression or neutrality pact, since this would not fit into the framework of the current situation.”

The final decision to conclude a pact could only be made as a result of a conversation between Stalin and Matsuoka on April 12, 1941, when the latter was ready to leave Moscow without signing the pact. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan was invited to the Kremlin during an evening viewing of the play by A.P. at the Art Theater. Chekhov's "Three Sisters".

At the beginning of the conversation, Matsuoka expressed the opinion that “if anything happens between the USSR and Germany, he would prefer to mediate between the USSR and Germany.” Since "Japan and the USSR are border states, he would like to improve relations between Japan and the USSR."

In response to Stalin’s remark about whether the tripartite pact would interfere with this, the interlocutor answered negatively, emphasizing that he had spoken in this sense in his conversation with Ribbentrop.

Developing this idea, Matsuoka explained that the fundamental issues of relations between Japan and the USSR need to be resolved from the perspective of “big problems, meaning Asia, the whole world, without limiting ourselves and not getting carried away by trifles,” such as, for example, the issue of Sakhalin, in order to “get rid of the Anglo-Saxons” in Asia, in particular in India, Iran and China.

To this Stalin replied: “The USSR considers cooperation with Japan, Germany and Italy a big issue. Comrade about this. Molotov notified Hitler and Ribbentrop when he was in Berlin and when the question was about turning the pact of three into a pact of four.” But Hitler, according to Stalin, said that for now he did not need military assistance from other states. Based on this, Stalin informed his Japanese interlocutor that “the question of the Four Pact and cooperation with the USSR may arise, but only if the affairs of Germany and Japan (obviously in the fight against the Anglo-Saxons. - K.Ch.) will go badly,” and therefore the Soviet government now limits its relations with Japan to a neutrality pact, but views it “as a first step and a serious step towards future cooperation on major issues.”

Further, the interlocutors agreed that the issue of the territorial integrity of the MPR and Manchukuo should be recorded in a separate declaration attached to the pact, and the issue of the liquidation of Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin should be stated in exchange letters simultaneously with the signing of the pact. Stalin suggested indicating in the letters that the concessions would be liquidated within “two or three months,” but then agreed to Matsuoka’s wording—“within several months.”

Emphasizing the importance of this issue, Stalin went to the map and, pointing to Primorye, said that “Japan holds in its hands all the outlets of Soviet Primorye to the ocean - the Kuril Strait near the southern cape of Kamchatka, the La Perouse Strait south of Sakhalin, the Tsushima Strait near Korea.” Therefore, the sale of Northern Sakhalin to Japan would generally mean the strangulation of the Soviet Union. “What kind of friendship is this?” - the Soviet leader asked reasonably and ultimately achieved a concession from Matsuoka, promising to consider later the issue of supplying 100 thousand tons of oil to Japan as compensation.

On April 13, a neutrality pact with an attached communiqué was signed in Moscow and the aforementioned letters were exchanged.

In Art. 1 of the pact contained the obligation of the parties, based on the desire for peace and friendship between the USSR and Japan, to maintain peaceful and friendly relations among themselves and mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the territories of the other contracting party.

Art. 2 provided that in the event that one of the contracting parties was subject to military actions on the part of one or more third states, the other contracting party will remain neutral throughout the conflict.

Art. 3 established the validity period of the pact for five years, and each contracting party could, one year before the expiration of this period, declare its intention to denounce this pact after the termination of its five-year validity period. Otherwise, the duration of the pact was automatically extended for another five years.

The declaration, which was signed by Molotov, Matsuoka and Tatekawa, contained a statement that, based on the spirit of the neutrality pact in order to ensure peace and friendly relations between the USSR and Japan, the parties undertake to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the MPR and Manchukuo.

Matsuoka and Molotov exchanged strictly confidential letters. Matsuoka's letter, the receipt of which was confirmed by Molotov in a reply letter, contained obligations to conclude a trade agreement and a fishing agreement in the near future, to liquidate Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin within a few months and to establish a mixed commission of representatives of the USSR, Japan, MPR and Manchukuo as soon as possible -th to settle border issues and deal with border disputes and incidents.

The neutrality pact was met with approval in both the Soviet and Japanese press. However, in Berlin, the signing of the pact caused displeasure, since in Germany they were surprised that Matsuoka did not heed the hints of Hitler and Ribbentrop about the possibility of war between Germany and the USSR. In this regard, Ribbentrop even protested to the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, Oshima.

Until recently, domestic researchers believed that this pact was concluded in case the USSR and Japan were attacked by other states, and since Japan itself attacked them and, therefore, turned out to be not an “object of military action”, but its subject, this agreement not related to the Soviet-Japanese War of 1945.

However, the publication of documents and materials on Soviet-German relations showed that the obligation contained in both the Soviet-German and Soviet-Japanese pacts not to attack one’s partner if he becomes an “object of military action” applies to any war, regardless from the one who unleashed it.

Despite the fact that the main purpose of concluding a neutrality pact with the USSR was to ensure the security of Japan's rear, which gave it the opportunity to pursue an aggressive policy towards Asian countries and the United States, Soviet historiography traditionally placed excessive emphasis on Tokyo's intention, by concluding this agreement, to camouflage forced preparations to an attack on the USSR immediately after the start of German aggression. In addition, it was argued that even before the conclusion of the neutrality pact, German leaders at the negotiations in Berlin informed Matsuoka about the possibility of a German attack on the USSR in the very near future.

Soviet historiography also sets out the point of view of Japanese military circles, especially the leadership of the Kwantung Army, on the role of the neutrality pact as a means of “buying time to make an independent decision about starting a war against the Soviets.” Claiming that this opinion reflected the unified position of all circles in Japan, researchers at the same time cite three different concepts of the actions of the Japanese authorities in the event of a war between the USSR and Germany: 1) after a German attack on the USSR, immediately begin military operations against it; 2) attack the USSR after a preliminary successful expansion in a southern direction; 3) make a final decision on the start of a broad expansion against the USSR or in the south, depending on the successes or failures of Germany in the war with the Soviet Union.

Thus, researcher of Soviet-Japanese relations A.A. Koshkin (Arkadyev) pointed to the following reason that prompted the ruling circles of Japan to sign a neutrality pact: “In an effort to provide the empire with the maximum possible freedom of action and create the preconditions for a surprise Japanese attack on the USSR, the Japanese military-political leadership considered it expedient in the current situation to conclude a Japanese -Soviet Neutrality Pact." In addition, A.A. Koshkin believed that Japan's obligations under the Tripartite Pact could serve as a basis for it to launch an attack on the USSR.

“By concluding a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union,” he wrote, “the Japanese leadership sought to use it, on the one hand, as a cover for preparations for an attack on the USSR, and on the other, as a means of providing Japan with freedom in choosing the timing of anti-Soviet aggression.”

Developing this idea, A.N. Nikolaev supports the opinion of the Tokyo Tribunal, expressed in the verdict, that the conclusion of a neutrality pact with the USSR put the Japanese government in “an ambiguous position, since at that time it had obligations towards Germany under the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Three-Power Pact.”

In fact, the text of the additional protocol to the Anti-Comintern Pact (Article 1), not to mention its main text, as well as the Tripartite Pact (Article 3 taking into account Article 5), as already noted, do not contain any obligations for Japan to attack without fail on the USSR at the request of Berlin or Rome, especially since in these treaties the question of measures against the USSR is raised only if it commits an unprovoked attack, and does not itself become the target of an attack.

Accusing Japan of holding, simultaneously with negotiations on a pact with the USSR, negotiations on a five-year extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact is also missing the mark. (It was later extended until November 26, 1946).

In our opinion, the point of view deserves attention, according to which “the Anti-Comintern Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan was clearly directed not only and not so much against the USSR as a state, but against a certain sphere (more precisely, a direction. - K.Ch.) his foreign policy expansion, which was carried out by the hands of the Comintern... Later, Stalin carried out a repressive “purge” of internationalists in this organization (in terminology - “Atlantists”) and thereby cleared the way for improving relations between the USSR and Germany and Japan, which corresponded to the plans of the “Europeans” in these countries that advocated a union of European states against such “Atlantic” powers as Great Britain and the USA.”

However, negotiations on the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact were conducted in 1940-1941. in parallel with the negotiations on the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, not because the tripartite pact abolished the Anti-Comintern Pact formally, as V. Molodyakov believes, but because this was done in fact: firstly, as a result of Stalin’s purge of the international core of the Comintern and the transformation of this an organization that formally existed until 1943, as an appendage of the international department of the CPSU Central Committee; secondly, as a result of a radical reorientation of its participants. The USSR, in turn, also refused to use the Comintern as a means of its foreign policy expansion against the Axis powers.

And since the Comintern in the period immediately after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact existed only formally, negotiations on the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact were also formal. This is supported by the fact that additional Axis satellites joined first the Tripartite Pact and only then the Anti-Comintern Pact.

As for the proof of Matsuoka’s treachery precisely during the period of preparation for the conclusion of a neutrality pact with the USSR (since the summer of 1940), as well as his awareness of the timing of Germany’s attack on the USSR, then to clarify these issues one should turn to other documents.

The most convincing argument in favor of the fact that Matsuoka, even during the period of preparation for the conclusion of the neutrality pact with the USSR, was ready to violate it, is the statement of the Japanese Foreign Minister, which he made during a conversation with Ribbentrop in the spring of 1941 in Berlin. Matsuoka directly stated that in the event of a war between Germany and the USSR, the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact would “immediately lose force.”

Matsuoka began to receive reliable information about the timing of Germany’s attack on the USSR only a few days after returning to Tokyo, when the pact with the USSR had already been signed. Thus, the first message, an encrypted telegram from the Japanese ambassador to Germany, which arrived in Tokyo three days after the conclusion of the pact, read: “This year Germany will start a war against the USSR.” The same information soon began to arrive in Tokyo from Japanese military attaches in other countries.

Until May 1941, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, even after receiving information from the Japanese Ambassador to Germany Oshima about her imminent attack on the USSR, did not exclude the possibility that this message from Berlin to Japan aimed to disguise the preparation of a new massive offensive by German troops against England.

But at the end of May - beginning of June, Matsuoka nevertheless began to persuade the Emperor of Japan to annul the Soviet-Japanese neutrality pact, so that then, after Germany unleashed a war against the Soviet Union, to occupy Siberia to Irkutsk.

Nevertheless, even at the beginning of June, Matsuoka believed that the probability of German aggression against the USSR was 40% against the 60% possibility of resolving the conflict.

This opinion was shared by both the Japanese General Staff and War Minister Tojo.

“As a matter of fact, I concluded a neutrality pact,” Matsuoka said at the 32nd coordination meeting of the government and headquarters on June 25, 1941, “because I believed that Germany and the USSR would not start a war. If I had known that they would enter the war, I would have preferred to take a more friendly position towards Germany and would not have concluded a neutrality pact."

True, this statement, in our opinion, cannot be taken on faith, since the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs was made clear enough from Washington at the beginning of 1941 that war between Germany and the USSR was impending, in order to avoid an alliance between Tokyo and Moscow, and during his conversations in Berlin in the spring of 1941. And although he really did not know about the outbreak of war in the very near future, most likely the fear that if this war broke out, it would be difficult to secure Japan with a pact with the USSR, and this explains Matsuoka’s haste in this question

The point of view that the specific timing of the attack was not specifically communicated to him is supported by the directive of Hitler’s office of March 5, 1941: during the upcoming negotiations with Japan, i.e., with Matsuoka in Berlin, in no way should he be made aware of the existence of the accepted On December 18, 1940, the Barbarossa plan, according to which preparations for war with the Soviet Union was to be completed by May 15.

That is why in the spring of 1941, Tokyo, despite alarming messages from Berlin, did not speed up preparations for an attack on the USSR. This can be seen from the fact that from 1939 to mid-1941, the personnel of the Kwantung Army increased by only a few tens of thousands of people - from 270 thousand to 300-350 thousand people, which amounted to no more than half the number of Soviet troops in the Far East

The Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, guided by the desire to strengthen peaceful and friendly relations between both countries, decided to conclude a Neutrality Pact, and for this purpose appointed as their representatives: \75\

Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:

Yosuke Matsuoka, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jusanmi, Knight of the Order of the Sacred Treasure, First Class, and

Yoshitsugu Tatekawa, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Lieutenant General, Jusanmi, Knight of the Order of the Rising Sun of the first degree and the Order of the Golden Kite of the fourth degree,

Who, having presented to each other their respective powers, called to be drawn up in due and lawful form, have agreed as follows:

Article one

Both Contracting Parties undertake to maintain peaceful and friendly relations among themselves and to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the other Contracting Party.

Article two

In the event that one of the Contracting Parties becomes the object of hostilities on the part of one or more third powers, the other Contracting Party will remain neutral throughout the duration of the conflict.

Article three

This Pact comes into force on the date of its ratification by both Contracting Parties and remains in force for five years. If none of the Contracting Parties denounces the Pact one year before its expiration, it will be considered automatically extended for another five years.

Article Four

This Pact is subject to ratification as soon as possible. The exchange of instruments of ratification must take place in Tokyo, also as soon as possible.

In witness whereof, the above-mentioned representatives signed this Pact in two copies, drawn up in Russian and Japanese, and affixed their seals to it.

Compiled in Moscow on April 13, 1941, which corresponds to the 13th day of the fourth month of the 16th year Again.

6. Molotov Yosuke Matsuoka
Yoshitsugu Tatekawa

German diplomacy looked at the situation in Asia through the prism of the US ability to fight a war on two fronts - in Europe, helping Britain, and in the Pacific, confronting Japan. With this approach, stabilizing Soviet-Japanese relations, which would allow Tokyo to act more freely against the United States, was in German interests. It was also important for Berlin to distract Moscow through negotiations with Japan from the growing threat to the Soviet Union from Germany. At the same time, Hitler did not attach much importance to Japan's military assistance against the USSR, relying on the power of the German military machine and its ability to ensure a quick military defeat of the USSR in Europe on its own.

In addition, German diplomats were thoroughly aware of the content of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations, receiving information from both the Soviet and Japanese sides, and did not overestimate the severity of possible mutual obligations between Moscow and Tokyo. Berlin knew that the USSR had abandoned the idea of ​​a non-aggression pact, which it had put forward back in 1931. Now Moscow considered it possible to limit itself to a less binding neutrality treaty. For its part, the Japanese side, while insisting on a non-aggression pact, did not at the same time object to the neutrality treaty.

To understand the policy of the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941, it is important to keep in mind that in fact Moscow found itself in conditions of severe diplomatic isolation in the face of the German danger. Relations between the USSR and Britain and the USA were strained. The few remaining neutral states in Europe were afraid of Germany; they did not want, and could not, intervene in the Soviet-German confrontation.

Stalin received information about Hitler's plans to attack the USSR. This confrontation itself was obvious to all foreign observers and a very wide layer of the Soviet party, state and military elite in the USSR. But Stalin did not trust the former, and the latter, intimidated by the terror of the previous decade, remained silent, saving their lives. The question of choosing a line in relation to Germany was entirely in the hands of Stalin himself. This choice was to “not provoke” Hitler and to prepare for a military rebuff to him. However, military preparations had to be deployed in such forms, pace and scale as to again not give Berlin a reason to bring the decisive day closer.

Diplomatic correspondence suggests that in April 1941 and even later, Stalin did not rule out the possibility of, if not an agreement in principle, then at least a partial compromise with Germany, which would at least provide the USSR with a reprieve to prepare for war. The agreement with Japan in this sense provided some opportunities. Moscow tried to politically play up the fact of concluding an agreement with Tokyo as evidence of indirect participation in cooperation based on the Tripartite Pact.

The neutrality treaty was concluded in Moscow on April 13, 1941. In one package with it, a Soviet-Japanese declaration on mutual respect and territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Mongolia and Manchukuo was signed, which, in essence, recorded a partial division of the spheres of influence of the USSR and Japan in the Far East in such a way that Mongolia belonged to the Soviet sphere, and Manchukuo to the Japanese. The treaty was designed for five years (until April 1946) with the possibility of automatic extension for the next five years unless one of the parties announced its intention to denounce it a year before the expiration of the treaty. Simultaneously with the signing of the Soviet-Japanese documents, letters were exchanged, which contained Japan's obligation to liquidate all concessions remaining in its hands in Northern Sakhalin.

The Soviet-Japanese agreements confirmed the status quo in the Far East, but did not strengthen it. They did not limit Japan's intervention in China in the same way as they did the USSR's activities in support of the Chinese communists in the areas they controlled and the national separatists in Xinjiang.

At the same time, the agreement with Japan gave the Soviet Union certain benefits, since it reduced the likelihood of a war on two fronts and made it possible to free up forces to concentrate them for possible military operations in the European theater.

Towards the denunciation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact

On April 13, 1941, that is, before the German attack on the USSR and before the outbreak of war between Japan, on the one hand, and the United States and England, on the other, an agreement was signed in Moscow
neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan. The conclusion of the pact marked
would then mark the completion of a certain stage in the development of Soviet-Japanese relations. For over,
than two decades, starting from the time of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the formation of the Soviet state, these relations were completely unsatisfactory.
Japanese intervention in the Far East in 1918-1922, during which Japanese troops landed in Vladivostok and occupied Primorye, the Japanese occupation of northern Sakhalin, numerous border conflicts and, finally, memorable events at Lake Khasan and the Khalkhin Gol River
in 1938-1939—this is a far from complete list of facts indicating that
that the leadership circles of Japan for many years have been aggressive towards
The Soviet Union had a policy that more than once led to acute conflicts between both states. It took a lot of time for Japan's leadership to come to the conclusion
about the need to establish normal relations with its neighbor, the Soviet Union, and abandoned the policy of military “provocations and adventures in relation to the USSR.
The conclusion of the neutrality pact between the USSR and Japan on April 13, 1941 was evidence of the failure of such a policy of the Japanese leadership circles, which were ultimately forced to accept
way to regulate relations with the Soviet Union. The Neutrality Pact of April 13, 1941 played a positive role, eliminating a number of reasons for misunderstandings and conflicts with Japan,
fraught with danger, especially in a situation where Germany was increasingly discovering
their aspirations for new imperialist conquests and open domination in Europe.
On June 22, 1941, Germany, intoxicated by its easy successes in Western Europe, treacherously attacked the Soviet Union. Having rushed into a military adventure in the East, Germany counted on the same easy successes in the war against the Soviet Union, being confident in its military power, based on
on the enormous resources of almost all of Western Europe, captured by Germany.
Temporary successes of Germany in the first months of the war against the Soviet Union,
resulting from the surprise and suddenness of the vile Nazi German
The attacks, as is known, turned the heads of many Japanese politicians who were ready to place their bets on Hitler's card. But the rebuff that the Red Army gave to the brazen invader at the walls of Moscow and on a number of other sections of our front had a sobering effect on hotheads in Japan as well. However, in
The leading political and military circles of Japan at that time had already matured the idea of ​​​​the need to take advantage of the “golden opportunity”, as the most outspoken people openly expressed at that time
representatives of the Japanese military to begin implementing their innermost imperialist plans in the South Seas area. The further course of events in the Pacific, which began with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and the opening of hostilities between the United States and Great Britain,
on the one hand, and Japan, on the other, is known.
In the most difficult time for the USSR, Japan continued to strengthen its cooperation with Germany, which was not only of great political importance, but also provided significant assistance to Germany
in its war against the Soviet Union. During the war imposed by Germany on the Soviet Union, a radical division of forces occurred, resulting in the formation of a powerful Anglo-Soviet-American
coalition. At the same time, Japan waged and is waging a war against the allies of the USSR—the United States of America
and England.
Since the time when the Neutrality Pact was concluded, that is, from April 13, 1941, the situation has thus changed radically. Regarding this change, in a statement issued on April 5
The People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Grandfather V. M. Molotov to the Japanese Ambassador N. Sato says: “Germany attacked the USSR, and Japan, an ally of Germany, is helping the latter in its war against the USSR. In addition, Japan is at war with the USA and England, which are allies of the Soviet Union.”
Throughout this war, even when it had already become completely obvious that the German adventure
doomed to complete failure, Japan continued to strengthen its alliance with Germany by all means and provide support to German predatory imperialism.
The Soviet Government recognized that - “in this situation, the Neutrality Pact between Japan and
The USSR has lost its meaning, and the extension of this Pact has become impossible.”
In this regard, the Soviet Government informed the Japanese Government on April 5 of its desire to denounce the Pact with Japan. This statement, as you know, contains a reference to Article 3
Neutrality Pact, which states that the said Pact remains in force for
five years from the date of its ratification.
Article 3 also provides that if none of the signatories to this Pact denounces it one year before its expiration, it is considered automatically extended for the next five years. The signatories to the Pact now, by virtue of Article 3 of the Pact, must decide
the question is whether they should extend this Pact for the next five years, or declare its denunciation. As is known, the Soviet Government decided to inform the Japanese Government
about his desire to denounce the Pact of April 13, 1941.
The statement of the Soviet Government on April 5 about the denunciation of the Neutrality Pact between the Soviet Union and Japan is a direct consequence of the fact that Japan is an ally of Germany,
waging a vile predatory war against the Soviet Union, and that at the same time it is waging a war against the USA and England, which are allies of the Soviet Union.